We surveyed the preferences of individuals for allowing repeat renal transplantation before first time grafts. In a pilot survey without medical context, 71% (74%) of 151 individuals preferred no repeat participation of prior winners in a second raffle under a stakeholder (spectator) framing. Of 65 dialysis patients with end--stage renal disease, 88% preferred to allow repeat kidney grafts. Of 1,203 individuals without end--stage renal disease, 74% preferred to allow repeat kidney grafts as a spectator, 61% if as a stakeholder, but only 29% when asked about arbitrarily named candidates. 'Fairness' was the most common stated rationale in all surveys. Ethical guidelines currently do not support consideration of past resource use in future allocations. Given the source of many kidney grafts, public preferences may need to be considered.
Introduction
Decisions on how to distribute absolutely scarce medical resources are difficult for society as a whole, patients and their physicians. Kidney transplants for patients with end--stage renal disease (ESRD) are a leading example (Curtis, 2006; Marsden, 2003; Hippen, Thistlethwaite, and Ross, 2011) . Waiting lists for a transplant are long and growing (OPTN, 2011; Reese et al, 2010) , as yearly transplants are less than a fifth of the number waiting (OPTN, 12) . Many patients die while waiting (USRDS, 2012; CKDPC, 2010) . Indeed, half of transplant candidates aged 60 years or older on entry into the waiting list will die before receiving a deceased donor transplant (Schold et al, 2009 ).
Worse, half of ESRD patients who do receive a cadaveric organ will see this graft fail in about a decade (OPTN, 2011) , and hence many patients are awaiting a repeat graft (Coupel et al, 2003; Izquierdo et al, 2010) . A retransplant is neither technically difficult nor controversial (NKF, 2013) . Cost--effectively, kidney transplants dominate dialysis (NKF, 2013) , while repeat kidney transplantation compares favorably with other common therapies (Hornberger, Best, and Garrison, 1997 ). Yet little research has examined attitudes to the perceived fairness of repeated kidney transplantation (Piccoli et al, 2004) .
In the United States and Europe, kidney re--transplantation status does not currently affect the waiting--time oriented prioritization of renal grafts, independently of its impact on sensitization (OPTN, 2011; Mayer and Persijn, 2006) . Past use of medical resources is considered an ethically unacceptable criterion for future allocation (CEJA, 1995) , as theories of justice do not offer compelling arguments to choose between primary and repeated claimants (Ubel, Arnold, and Caplan, 1993) . While this said to result in equality of opportunity (Daniels, 2008; Donabedian, 1971) , egalitarianism alone is insufficient (Persad, Wertheimer, and Emanuel, 2009) , and not always easily implementable (Rid, 2009; Keren and Teigen, 2010) . Clearly, someone must go without -- at least temporarily --when someone else has a second opportunity at a kidney.
Bioethicists argue that only differences in intervention efficacy should be considered Ubel, Arnold, and Caplan, 1993) , but survey evidence is mixed (Huesch, 2012) .
In hypothetical scenarios, primary recipients were favored for organ donations compared to those waiting to be retransplanted (Chan, Cheung, and Yip, 2006; Ubel and Loewenstein, 1995) , although few appeared willing to completely abandon the retransplant candidates (Ratcliffe, 2000) . In practice, graft efficacy differences are not large, slightly in favor of retransplants in the US (OPTN, 2012) , and internationally slightly in favor of primary transplants with shrinking differences (Izquierdo et al, 2010) .
If both primary and secondary kidney graft candidates were considered equally deserving, then risk--averse decision--makers would favor random allocations across all candidates. Waiting time prioritization as performed today does not reflect equal claims as disproportionately fewer retransplant surgeries are performed compared to the number of retransplant candidates (OPTN, 2012) . Older patients, more likely to have experienced prior graft failure, face far bleaker odds of a graft (Schold et al, 2009 ).
On the other hand, if the two types were not considered equally deserving, then neither random allocations nor the current waiting time prioritizations would be favored.
Requiring re--accrual of waiting time seniority (OPTN, 2011) , is a bias against retransplant candidates. Performing approximately one in nine transplant surgeries on retransplant candidates is a bias against primary candidates (OPTN, 2012) .
The objective of this analysis was therefore to understand the perceived fairness of allowing repeat transplants before primary transplants. Accordingly, we surveyed the attitudes of members of the public and of dialysis patients towards the fairness of allowing repeat kidney transplantation.
Method
We analyzed three separate convenience sample sets of survey data (see 
Survey without medical context
First, we conducted an anonymous online survey from an extensive national panel maintained by Qualtrics who were compensated by the authors for access to the panel and for administration of the survey. Rolling recruitment continued until our target of 150 participants had been reached or exceeded. A total of 151 participants were compensated by Qualtrics by receiving redeemable online currency for the time spent completing the survey.
Participants designated their preferences and stated their free text rationales for a choice between two back--to--back raffle designs that involved 10 hypothetical participants.
The only difference between the two designs is that the winner of the first raffle did or did not participate in the second. In the first raffle of each design, each hypothetical participant has a 1 in 10 chance of winning a $100 prize. Allowing participation of the winner would result in an identical second raffle. However, choosing to exclude the prior winner would result in each remaining participant having a 1 in 9 chance of winning $100 in the second raffle. The expected payoff in either hypothetical design is equivalent, but the variance is lower in the exclusion design reflecting the less risky nature of sampling without replacement. Each subject was asked to state their preference over raffle designs both as a hypothetically implicated stakeholder (him or her and nine other players) and as a hypothetically impartial spectator (10 other players not including subject). The order of the two framings was presented randomly across subjects.
Survey in individuals without end--stage renal disease
Second, we conducted an online survey from an extensive national compensated panel maintained by Clear Voice Research which was compensated by the authors for access to the panel and administration of the survey. Of 453,121 total possible panelists, we targeted a subgroup of 171,173 (38%) meeting age, health, and ethnicity characteristics and oversampling older panelists with chronic conditions (see Supplementary Table S1 ). Of these, Clear Voice Research randomly invited 29,148 to participate in the survey and rolling recruitment continued until our target of 1,100 respondents had been reached or exceeded. A total of 1,103 responses were obtained.
All subjects received information on ESRD and treatment options and were randomized to receive one of two vignettes. The "Equal efficiency" one stated that no difference in graft survival rates existed between primary and repeated transplants. The "Efficiency difference" one stated that a transplanted kidney would survive slightly longer in a patient receiving a primary transplant than in a patient receiving a second transplant.
The difference in the vignettes reflects prior theoretical and empirical evidence that subjects may prefer equity in distribution of healthcare resources even at small costs in efficacy (Ubel and Loewenstein, 1995; Ratcliffe, 2000) . Error! Bookmark not defined.,Error! Bookmark not defined. Both vignettes stated that the waiting list for donor kidneys was long, and that a patient receiving a second kidney graft likely meant that a patient in need of a primary graft would go without. Each subject was asked their preference for allowing repeat kidney grafts under three different framings presented in random order (Figure 1 ). In the neutral framing each subject was asked whether a prior recipient of a graft should be allowed to receive a second kidney transplant. In the named individual framing each subject was asked if an arbitrarily named 'Mr Jones' should be allowed to receive a second kidney transplant before an arbitrarily named 'Mr Jackson' with identical health status waiting for a primary graft.
Under a stakeholder framing the subject was instructed to assume he or she had kidney failure and was on the waiting list to receive a transplant. The subject was then again asked whether a prior recipient of a graft should be allowed to receive a second kidney transplant. After each answer of 'yes' or 'no' a different web--based screen allowed panelists to choose one of six possible researcher--selected reasons for their choice.
Survey of dialysis patients
Third, an in--person survey eliciting preferences for allowing repeated renal transplantation grafts among ESRD patients was conducted at a dialysis clinic operated by DaVita. The Of all 68 patients receiving hemodialysis on those days, one declined participation, and two were unable to respond due to intercurrent medical conditions. The remaining 65 gave informed consent to an anonymous survey not impacting their current/future treatment. Subjects were individually interviewed in private during their dialysis treatment and were asked whether someone who had already had a kidney transplant once should be allowed to receive another one.
The DaVita research associate read the survey to patients and then captured verbal responses by hand. Each patient viewed completed responses for confirmation and was not compensated for their participation. Interviewees were explained that the question was to be answered in general terms, as opposed to applying to them individually. Subjects were advised that the answers were anonymous without impact on their own treatment or treatment options.
Analytic Strategy
Statistical analyses were limited to testing the significance of differences in the proportions of respondents preferring to allow or disallow repeated kidney grafts using χ--squared tests. We tested whether different framings of the question led to differences in response by the same subject using McNemar tests of symmetry. Finally, a Kruskal--Wallis test was used to understand whether there were any significant differences between survey respondents randomized to the Equal efficiency vignette or the Efficiency difference vignette. Analysis was performed using Stata/SE software, version 10.1 (Stata Corp; College Station, Texas). All analyses were 2--tailed. No adjustments for multiple comparisons were made (Rothman, 1990) . We considered all P--values <.05 to be statistically significant.
Results

Survey without medical context
The survey without medical context showed a strong preference for exclusion of a prior winner in a subsequent raffle (Table 1 ). In the stakeholder framing, 71% of the respondents preferred the exclusion design (p<.001) while 74% preferred exclusion under the spectator framing (p<.001). 
Survey in individuals without end--stage renal disease
A total of 562 (51%) of 1,103 respondents in the Clear Voice survey were randomized to the Equal Efficiency vignette. Under the neutral framing (Table  2 , first column), there was a strong preference for allowing repeat grafts (74%, p<.001). Fairness towards the repeat graft candidate or the primary graft candidate were the most common stated rationales. In the framing which named individuals this preference was reversed (Table 2, center column). Here 72% of respondents chose not to allow Mr. Jones a second graft while Mr. Jackson had not received his first (p<.001). Of the 561 subjects who fully completed the survey, 26% preferred allowing repeat grafts under both framings while 24% preferred not allowing repeat grafts under both framings (Table 3a) . A significant plurality (48%, p<.001) of the respondents switched preferences from 'allow' to 'do not allow' across the two framings. Under the stakeholder framing which supposed the respondent had ESRD and was himself or herself on the waiting list for a donor kidney (Table 2 , right column), there was a strong preference for allowing repeat grafts (61%, p<.001). A McNemar test showed a significantly larger proportion of respondents (Table 3b ) preferred to allow a 2 nd graft under this framing than under the framing which named graft candidates (p<.001). 
Survey of dialysis patients
Of the DaVita dialysis patients a slight majority was male (58%), median age was 57 years The results of the in--person survey administered to DaVita dialysis patients were similar to but stronger than the Clear Voice survey results under the stakeholder framing. A total of 57 (88%) preferred to allow repeat kidney grafts (p<.001), while 6 (9%) stated that someone who had already had one transplant should not be allowed to receive one and 2 declined to state a preference. The Da Vita survey was not adequately powered to detect bivariate differences in response by age, gender, retransplant or waiting list status.
In unreported analysis, a multivariable logistic regression of gender, length of treatment, age, and waiting list status on response choice had pseudo R 2 of 0.29 and a C--statistic of 0.88. Entered continuously, only age was significantly associated with response choice with increasing age reduced the odds of choosing to allow second grafts (odds ratio 0.87; 95% CI 0.77--0.98).
Discussion
Our study found that subjects preferred to exclude prior winners from further opportunities to win, in a hypothetical pair of raffles without medical context. In contrast,
we found that subjects without ESRD preferred to allow repeat kidney grafts when asked in neutral terms. These preferences were expressed after receiving unambiguous briefing information about the opportunity costs of giving a scarce organ to any one candidate. The study demonstrated a smaller majority in favor of allowing repeat kidney grafts when subjects were asked to suppose that they had ESRD and were on a waiting list. In the latter framing considerations of equity may have been balanced with considerations of one's own future needs (Huesch and Brady, 2010) .
We found a marked preference reversal when subjects without ESRD were asked to choose between two named individual candidates. A significant majority of respondents preferred not to allow the named secondary candidate to have a repeat graft before the named primary candidate. These results were unexpected, and not easily linked to prior empirical evidence of an 'identifiable victim effect' (Jenni and Lowenstein, 1997) , and a 'rule of rescue' favoring repeated interventions on patients especially when these are identified individuals (Ubel, Arnold, and Caplan, 1993; McKie and Richardson, 2003) . We conjecture that framing the question in such a way that both options were an identifiable individual blunted the effect of the 'rule of rescue'.
Results were similar regardless of the vignette's claims of similar or worse graft failure rates among retransplants; implying that subjects did not noticeably trade off equity in distribution for graft efficiency (Bleichrodt, Doctor, and Stolk, 2005) . Finally, regardless of transplant or waiting list status, subjects with ESRD overwhelmingly supported allowing retransplants, in line with current organ transplant guidelines. Prior research differs as to how closely patients agree (Louis, Sankar and Ubel, 1997) or disagree (Geddes et al, 2005) with such guidelines. Had a 'present bias' existed in these choices (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1993) , towards shorter waiting times, patients might have been expected to prefer not to allow repeat transplants since these would delay their own surgeries. Instead, our findings are consistent with ESRD patients' considering their own ultimate future needs which may include a repeat graft.
Kidney organ allocation rules currently seek to offer equality of opportunity to repeat and first--time kidney graft candidates, conditional on same medical need. In particular, kidney re--transplantation status does not currently affect the waiting--time oriented prioritization of renal grafts, independently of its impact on sensitization (OPTN, 2011; Mayer and Persijn, 2006) .
In the US, these rules are administered by the United Network for Organ Sharing, the This study had a number of important limitations. The results were limited by its reliance on convenience samples which can only imprecisely represent national preferences for the allocation of scarce medical resources. This limitation renders these findings more hypothesis--generating than hypothesis--confirming. This is especially germane in our small study of dialysis patients. However, patients' preferences are arguably important inputs in the allocation process (Ahn and Hornberger, 1996; Freeman et al, 2009) .
A related limitation is that the preferences of the general public were also elicited in a process which abstracted from many important clinical and other factors which impact the allocation decision. The views of transplant surgeons, nephrologists and other medical providers, care--givers and relatives were not captured. Yet it is members of the general public that form the pool of potential cadaveric organs, and as such are interested parties.
To the extent that the supply of donor organs critically depends on the public's trust that equitable measures will be used in the distribution (Guttman, 1996) , surveys such as ours may help to inform organ allocation procedures.
Our study has also ignored black market, price--based mechanisms which allocate kidneys to a subset of privileged patients. The World Health Organization estimates 5% of the 66,000 kidney transplants performed globally involve the sale/purchase of a human organ (Shimazono, 2005) . Such black markets interact indirectly with ethical transplant centers in purchasers' home countries due to the need for after--care (Ambagtsheer et al, 2012) . More directly, given the long and growing waiting lists in developed countries for kidney transplants, future use of such black markets by developed world patients may increase.
Finally, as opposed to absolute scarcity, relatively scarce resources have their supply is limited only by decisions on how many financial inputs to apply (Kock, 1996 ). An ICU bed or chemotherapy is a relatively scarce resource often in short supply in the short run. The consequences for hospitalized patients of a full ICU include changes in treatment goals e.g. to comfort care (Stelfox et al, 2012) . Decisions of how to deal with chemotherapy availability resemble the ethical difficulties faced with dealing with absolutely scarce and indivisible resources (Rosoff et al, 2012) . Nevertheless, our study is silent as to the ethics of, and preferences for, allocating relatively scarce resources. Further elucidation of such preferences seems desirable. Suppose you and 9 others will take part in a pair of raffles. You prefer which design?
Design A:
In one raffle you have a 1/10 chance to win $100, followed by another raffle in which you again have a 1/10 chance to win $100.
Design B:
In one raffle you have a 1/10 chance to win $100. If you didn't win, you have another raffle in which you now have a 1/9 chance to win $100.
Briefly, any reason why?
Spectator framing
Suppose 10 other people -not including you -will take part in a pair of raffles. You prefer which design?
In one raffle everyone has a 1/10 chance to win $100, followed by another raffle in which everyone again has a 1/10 chance to win $100.
In one raffle everyone has a 1/10 chance to win $100. For the nine who didn't win, they have another raffle in which everyone now has a 1/9 chance to win $100.
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